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GAUTHIER AND NASH: social contract II
by Ken Binmore*
Remember always to study power as it is, not as you would
have it be.
Machiavelli.
0. Introduction. This is the second of several free-standing papers whose
beginnings lie in Rawls' [1958,1968,1972] theory of the social contract. The aim of
the sequence of papers is to defend a version of Rawls' "egalitarian"1 conclusion for
a world in which agents are assumed to be constrained only by rational self-interest.
It should be emphasized that the program entails a very substantial re-
evaluation of Rawls' approach. This began in Part I with a refusal to follow Rawls
in rejecting orthodox decision theory. Instead, Harsanyi's alternative formulation
[1953,1955,1958,1977] was appraised. Although his defense of utilitarianism is
rejected, Harsanyi's utility theory framework forms the basis of my own approach.
However, Harsanyi and Rawls2 settle bargaining questions by appealing to an implicit
"ideal observer" and this will not suffice for my purposes.
This is a view shared with Gauthier [1986]. However, I differ from Gauthier
in taking an orthodox view on how bargaining questions should be resolved, and it
is this difference that occasions the current paper. But the paper is not a piece of
"infighting among bargaining theorists" [Gauthier, 1986. p1
46 1. It is intended as a
user's guide to what I see as the mainstream position among contemporary game
theorists on bargaining issues. This mainstream has only recently emerged from some
*The material of the paper is an expanded extract from a long ST/ICERD (liscus-
sion1 paper "'Game Theory and the Social Contract" (88/170). This supercdes an earlier
ST/ICERD discussion paper (84/108) with the same title.
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notoriously muddy backwaters. Such an exposition may therefore be timely for those
who do riot follow the economics literature. Some technicalities need to be faced,
but nothing that is likely to cause difficulties for anyone with a serious interest in
bargaining theory. The chief points to be made concern the manner in which the
Nash Bargaining Solution is defended and the circumstances under which its use is
appropriate. Other bargaining solutions receive incidental consideratiol.
Apart from an occasional comment, specific reference to Gauthier's "Morals by
Agreement" is left to a concluding section. As for the sequence of papers of which
this is part II, the first part contains a reconstruction of Rawls a la Harsanyi. Parts
III and IV will be asides on evolutionary issues. Part V will contain a Humneaii
reinterpretation of Rawls' social contract theory (as opposed to his Kantiain view).
With this reinterpretation, "egalitarian" conclusions can be defended without recourse
to hypotheses that need distress any conservative, no matter how red his neck. (This
will seem less surprising when one learns how what it is that gets split equally is
defined.) The ideas are closely related to those of Buchanan [1975, 1976] and Sugden
[1986]. Part VI will relate this material to the bargaining solutions covered here.
Finally, there will be a paper with the title "A Liberal Leviathan" which offers a
philosophical overview.
1. The Nash Program. The most important point concerns the interpretation of
the Nash Bargaining Solution. Nash [1950] defended this in two ways. His axiomatic
defense is well-known and has been extensively discussed. His second defense depends
on the analysis of a specific model of a negotiation process in which both bargainers
are restricted to making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it demands (section 3 and
section 8(iii) of Part I). With some vestigial uncertainty about precisely what is
available, Nash shows that optimal non-cooperative play in this dlemand game leads
to an outcome which approximates his bargaining solution. This paper :ontendls that
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Nash's axiomatic defense cannot be properly understood without an appreciation
of at least some of the non-cooperative bargaining games of which Nash's demand
game is one example. The two lines of attack are simply different aspects of a single
conceptual approach nowadays referred to as the Nash program [1951,19531.
The idea is very reductionist. Where opportunities for negotiation exist, the
proposal is that the various ploys open to the negotiators be modeled as formal
moves in a non-cooperative game. The term "non-cooperative" refers to the manner
in which the negotiation game is to be analyzed. The players are assumed to be
motivated only by rational self-interest, and attention therefore centers on locating
equilibria of the negotiation game. (Confusion sometimes arises here between a
Nash equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution. In a two-player game, to which
attention is always confined in this paper, a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies,
one for each player, such that each strategy is an optimal response to the other. The
Nash bargaining solution, on the other hand, is a particular rule for selecting a pair
of payoffs from those available and takes no explicit account of strategic questions.)
If one can formalize the relevant negotiation procedure adequately and then locate
an appropriate equilibrium, whether Nash or some more refined variant, which is
unequivocally the "right" equilibrium, then the bargaining problem is solved. The
solution of the bargaining problem is the "right" equilibrium outcome-i.e. the
payoffs the players receive if they both use their equilibrium strategies during the
play of the negotiation game.
Of course, major difficulties exist. (See Binmore/Dasgupta [1987] for a fuller
account.) Nash's axiomatic approach is designed to short-circuit these. He asks what
properties one might anticipate the equilibrium outcome to have. He then codifies
these properties as "axioms" and demonstrates that only one pair of payoffs satisfies
the axioms: namely, the Nash bargaining solution. Having arrived at this conclusion.
it is tempting to discard the conceptual frarnework of non-cooperative negotiation
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games as redundant scaffolding. But this would be a serious mistake. One must have
a view on what the relevant negotiation game is before one can make a judgement on
what properties its equilibrium outcome ought to have. If the negotiation game does
not belong to the class of those Nash had in mind when formulating his axioms, then
the Nash bargainng solution will be wrong. Even when the Nash bargaining solution
is right, it is easy to go astray by applying it wrongly (section 6).
This account of the Nash program has been included largely so that a list can
be made of interpretations of the Nash bargaining solution that I specifically want to
deny as relevant to my social contract theory. If one hopes to convince a sceptical
conservative, there is no point in beginning with hypotheses which he will be bound
to reject. It is therefore important to stick with an interpretation in which agents act
like horno economicus. That is to say, they optimize as individuals.
(1) Collective rationality interpretations. Gauthier [1986,p129] asks: "Whether
there are principles of rational bargaining with the same context-free universality of
application as the principle of expected utility maximization. . . ?" He then follows
numerous others in offering some idiosyncratic principles of his own which lead to a
version of the "bargaining solution" of Kalai and Smorodinsky [1975]. I think that the
answer to his question is "no". Without the context of a negotiation procedure, the
bargaining problem is indeterminate. The Nash program calls for a relevant context
to be established and then asks that the appropriate principles of rational bargaining
for that context be deduced from the principle of expected utility maximization.
Nash's axioms, notably the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" (section 2), are
not to be seen as context-free, collective rationality principles.
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(2) Behavioral interpretations. Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] say that
the bargaining problem is outside the scope of game theory because its resolution
depends on the psychology of the bargainers. Nash [1950] refers to equal l)argai1mg
skill on the part of the players (although he explicitly corrects himself later [1953]).
Harsanyi [1977] quantifies such a notion, in the context of an informal dynamic
bargaining model, by reviving an idea of Zeuthen [1930] and elevating this to the
status of a principle: Zeuthen's principle. More recent advances in game theory mean
that it is possible to dispense with such ad hoc behavioral assumptions provided that
what the players actually can or cannot do is adequately tied down. It is true that a
price is paid for this. The game-theoretic analysis for a chimpanzee playing Chess,
for example, becomes the same as for Alekhine.3 If both optimize, both will do the
same. But this is the price that is always paid for using homo economicus as a model
for homo sapiens. In any case, interpretations of the Nash axioms in terms of the
psychology of the players, or in terms of variants of Zeuthen's obsolete principle, are
not to be admitted.
(3) Ethical interpretations. These are the most invidious. Raiffa [1953] compared
a number of axiom systems, of which Nash's was one, as candidates for a "fair"
arbitration scheme. Since then, the idea that the Nash bargaining solution is properly
to be interpreted in this manner has taken on a life of its own and the Nash bargaining
solution is routinely rejected on the grounds that it has no merit as an ethical concept.
My own view, which simply echoes what is orthodox in social choice theory, is that
ethical decisions require inter-personal comparison of utility units. Such comparisons
are expressly ruled out-of-court by Nash's axioms. That is to say, it is agreed that
the Nash barga'ning solution has no merit as an ethical concept. When used, it is to
predict what the result would be, under certain ideal circumstances, if agents were
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to act as individual optimizers. The issue is therefore never whether or not one likes
the result. As with 2 + 2 = 4, the only issue is whether the result is accurate.
2. Nash's axioms. As in part I of this sequence of papers, there will be two
protagonists: Adam and Eve. If they are rational in their attitudes to risk, in the
sense axiomatized by Von Neuman and Morgenstern, their personal p preferences can
be represented by utility functions A: S -+ ;R and pE: S -+ +. in such a way that
Adam and Eve always behave as though maximizing expected utility. The set S of
feasible deals on which Adam and Eve might agree is a subset of the set S on which
their preferences are defined.4 A particular member so of So represents the current
status quo (on which more in section 5). In terms of Von Neumann and Morgenstern
utilities the feasible set is
X = {(A(s), 'PE(s)) : E So}
The point d = (p A(so), PE(so)) will be called the disagreement point. The pair (X, d)
is said to be a "Nash bargaining problem".
Fig.1A illustrates a pair (X, d). The diagram incorporates the assumptions
about X that will routinely be made: namely, that X is closed, bounded above,
convex and comprehensive.5 For comment on these assumptions, see part I, section
8(iii). It will also be assumed that (d is an interior point of X.
Fig.1A also illlustrates the weighted Nash bargaining solution n for (X, d)
corresponding to the bargaining powers 13A > 0 and 3 E > 0. This is the value of
x = (xA, XE) at which the weighted "Nash product"
,.= (xA - d)A^.(xE -. d&I
is maximized subject to the requirements that x E X and x > d. Notice that
only the ratio !#A/BE is significant. The alternative geometric characterization, that
LN/M'N = IA/fiE as illustrated in fig.1A, is often less cumbersome t~o use.
Figures 1A and 1B here
Two properties of the weighted Nash bargaining solution require emphasis.
The first is that the deal that results from its use - i.e. the deal t whlic'hi satisfies
n = (VA(t), pE(t)), is independent of the calibration of tIe utility scales built into (p
and pL. (Nothing changes, for example if x A and dA are replaced, in the definition of
the Nash product, by BXA + C and BdA + C, where B > 0 and C are constants). A
bargaining solution which failed to satisfy this requirement would be incoherent from
the viewpoint of the Nash program. This is because it is only the players' personal
preferences which actually have substance. A utility function is a mathematical
invention whose purpose is simply to ease the task of describing an individual's
personal preferences. It is the latter which are the primitives in Von Neumann and
Morgenstern's theory. An individual does not prefer s to t because y(s) > V(t) : on
the contrary, V(s) > p(t) because s is preferred to t. In particular, Bch+ C represents
an individual's preferences just as well as p.
In the Von Neumann and Morgenstern theory, By + C and p are indistin-
guishable. But an ethical theory needs to distinguish them as a preliminary to a
discussion of the inter-personal comparison of utilities (Part I, section 6). Such a
theory therefore needs to add further primitive assumptions to those of Von Neumaniin
and Morgenstern. There is, of course, a tradition in which utility functions themselves
are taken as primitives. Significance is then assigned to utility scales by fiat. Such an
approach seems to me to beg the question. Bertrand Russell said that Mathematics
is the subject where we do not know what we are talking about and do not care
whether what we are saying is true. But this surely ought not to be true of Ethics.
The independence of irrelevant alternatives is illustrated in fig.1B. The feasible
set X has been replaced by a smaller feasible.set Y which still contains the ba,rgaining
solution n for the problem (X, d). The condition requires that the bargaining solution
for (Y, d) remains at n under such circumstances. The following result of Roth [1979]
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(also paper 1 of Binmore/Dasgupta [1987]) concerns functions f which map each
pair (X, d) onto a point n = f(X, d) in the set X. Strong individual rationality is an
unfortunate way of expressing the very mild requirement that n > d.
Proposition. A function f satisfies the properties
1. Strong individual rationality
2. Independence of utility calibration
3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives
if and only if /3A > 0 and 1E > 0 exist such that n = f(X,d) is the weighted
Nash bargaining solution corresponding to /3 A and 13E.
Nash [1950] also required Pareto efficiency and symmetry. The first of these
is a conclusion in the above formulation. The role of an additional assumption of
symmetry is simply to ensure that /3A = 13E. This is the case normally understood
when the Nash bargaining solution is mentioned.
The first requirement of the proposition is very mild. It has been argued that
the second is no constraint at all in the current context. All therefore rests on the
much maligned third property.
It may be that "collective rationality" is genuinely meaningful in some situations
in spite of Arrow's theorem and other impossibility results.8 If so, then the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives is certainly one of the candidates for a property
that collective rationality should satisfy. But I do not think it should be (lefendedl
on such grounds in a bargaining context, although its name clearly invites such an
interpretation (the alternatives in X but not in Y being "irrelevant", since they are
not chosen when n is available).
Jn game theory jargon, the independence of irrelevant alternatives should
b)e seen as an implementability requirement7 . Roughly speaking, a payoff pair is
implementable if there exists a game (of some specific type) for which the payoff Ipair
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is an equilibrium outcome. Here, as elsewhere, the water is muddied by the existence
of theorems which are not strictly relevant. These concern precise implementation.8
But one ought only to care about being able to implement within as small a margin of
error as one chooses. However, this is a technical point. What needs to be emphasized
here is that, if it is indeed true that the independence of irrelevant alternatives can
sensibly be seen as an implementability requirement, then it is necessary that it
be insisted upon, given the aims of the Nash program. But is it sensible to see it
this way? This is not a question which is easy to answer in the abstract. It seems
necessary to look at some specific bargaining games.
3. Nash's demand game. Adam demands x. Simultaneously, Eve demands y.
Each gets his or her demand unless these are incompatible, in which case each gets
nothing. The probability that a pair (x, y) of demands is compatible is p(zc, y). If
the demands are Von Neumann and Morgenstern utilities,9 and (a, b) is a Nash
equilibrium, then x = a must maximize xp(x, b) and y = b must maximize yp(a, y).
The reason is that xp(x, b) is the expected payoff to Adam given that Eve has chosen
b. Similarly, yp(a, y) is the expected payoff to Eve given that Adam has chosen a.
When differentiation is legitimate, it follows that
ap (a, b) +p(a, b) = 0
(3.1)
bp y(a, b) + p(a, b) = 0
If the contour p(x, y) = p(a, b) admits a tangent line at the point (a, b), this is given
by
pz(a, b)(x - a) + p,(a, b)(y - b) = 0




as illustrated in fig.2A. That is to say, (a, b) is the Nash bargaining solution10 for the
problem (Y, 0), where Y is the set shaded in fig.2A.
Figures 2A and 2B here
Of course, when there is no uncertainty about what demands are compatible,
then differentiation is not legitimate because p is discontinuous (since then p(.r, y) = 1
when (x, y) E X, and p(x, y) = 0 when (x, y) ( X). In this case, any Pareto-efficient
(x, y) of X with x > 0 and y > 0 is a Nash equilibrium. Without a criterion for
selecting one of these as a solution of the demand game, one is left therefore with an
indeterminate situation"l. To obtain a determinate result, some vestigial uncertainty
is required. It is natural to model this by supposing that each contour p(x, y) = A,
with 0 < A < 1, approximates the boundary of X as indicated in fig.2B. Any
Nash equilibrium of the demand game with such a dash of uncertainty will then
approximate the Nash bargaining solution for the problem (X, 0).
Is it genuinely appropriate to attach such significance to the possible existence
of vestigial uncertainties? Evolutionary arguments in support of a positive answer
appear in Parts III and IV. Other, more conventional, arguments appear in Bin-
more/Dasgupta [1987,pp 161-167]. But perhaps it is enough, for the current paper,
to observe that nothing is ever certain in life, not even death and taxes.
Return now to the independence of irrelevant alternatives and consider the
following abstract bargaining game based on Nash's demand game. Two players
choose negotiation strategies s1 and .52 from strategy sets Si and S2, which are fixed
independently of X and d. A fixed function g : Si xS2 -+ R
2 determines the payoffs.
The payoff pair is 9(s1 , s2), unless g (s1, s2) X , in which case the payoff pair is d.
Suppose the game always has a unique, non-trivial, Nash equilibriumn' generating
the outcome n. What now happens if X is replaced by Y as in the independence
of irrelevant alternatives? Observe that the same negotiation strategies remain in
11
equilibrium and so generate the same outcome n. In this situation the equilibrium
outcome rrtust therefore satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
4. Commitment and time. I will not say that it is obviously false that there is a
"context-free" bargaining solution in the sense of the Nash program. Nevertheless it is
false. The Nash demand game implements the Nash bargaining solution. On the other
hand, Moulin [19841 constructs a bargaining game which implements the bargaining
solution of Kalai and Snorodinsky [1975] (see section 12). Does one conclude that
both bargaining solutions are equally "legitimate"? I think not. Moulin's game
requires Adam and Eve to begin by simultaneously naming a probability. The player
who wins this auction, by bidding the highest probability p, then gets to propose an
outcome1 3 s. If the other player assents to this proposal, a referee then organizes a
lottery that generates the final result. The lottery yields s with probability p, and
the status quo d with probability 1 -p. If the other player refuses, she gets to make a
counter-proposal which, if accepted, leads to the same rigmarole as before (with the
same probability p). If the counter-proposal is refused, d occurs for certain.
Moulin's game has been given in detail to make clear how "unnatural" its rules
are. Who organized this game and why? Where did the referee come from? And,
most importantly, what constrains the players to obey the rules?
As regards bargaining in Rawls' "original position" (Part I, section 2), and in
most other contexts also, one wants to minimize on the constraints hypothesized
as restricting the players' freedom of action. One can argue that the Nash demand
game epitomizes this minimizing aim. Rational players choose the course of action
that maximizes expected utility given their beliefs. If they are not shackled by
informational constraints, they will know exactly what to believe and what to prefer.
What course of action will they then choose in a bargaining situation? If they have
the freedom to make commitments (binding promises), it is to be anticipated that
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they will do so at the earliest possible moment, leaving themselves no room for future
maneuver, so as to confront their opponent with a take-it-or-leave-it problem. Thus
all action will be telescoped into the first instant as modeled in the Nash demland
game.
But I do not think this is a good argument. It is true that one does not want to
invent a-irtificial constraints on the )layers' freedom of action. But nor loes one wish to
invent artificial freedoms of opportunity. Much of Part I is concerned with this point
and so comment here will be restricted to the remark that to announce a commitment
is not to make a commitment. As Schelling [1960] demonstrates, commitments need
an enforcement mechanism to make them stick. But, to hypothesize an enforcement
inechanism without explanation, is to run afoul of the minimizing principle.
One must therefore proceed without primitive commitment assumptions. This
does not mean that threats, for example, are no longer to be regarded as relevant:
only that, where threats are made, an endogenous explanation must be offered of why
they are credible. You may say that you will do something if a future contingency
occurs, but why should I believe you if what you threaten will not be optimal after
the contingency is realized? Notice that time has now entered the picture. No longer
can it be argued that all of the action can be seen as telescoped into a single instant.
To illustrate these points, imagine the Nash demand game, without uncertainty,
modified so that Adam makes his demand first. Eve is then left with a take-it-or-
leave-it ultimatum. If Adam's ultimatum leaves her more than her status quo payoff,
rationality says that she must accept.'4 To express this more grandiosely, the only
equilibrium in the one-player .subgame which follows such an ultimatum from Adam
requires Eve to make the maximum dlemand cornpatible with that already made by
Adam. Adam, knowing that Eve will behave rationally in these subgames, therefore
optimizes by ininimizing the arnount that his denmanid leaves for Eve. Thus Adam
scoops the pot.'-5
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Of course, with the Nash bargaining solution demands nA and nE, Adam does
not scoop the pot. Nevertheless, the pair (flA, nE) is a Nash equilibrium for the
ultimatum game (along with many others). If Eve is always going to use the strategy
of demanding n E whatever Adam does, then Adam cannot gain by demanding more
than na.A The point here is that the definition of a Nash equilibrium is too crude to
capture the fact that a threat by Eve to play this way is just not credible. When time
is relevant, the Nash equilibrium idea needs to be refined.
The purpose of analyzing the ultimatum game is to introduce Selten's [1975]
notion of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The definition is very simple. The equilibrium
strategies must constitute a Nash equilibrium, not only in the whole game, but in
every subgame as well.' 6
5. Rubinstein's bargaining game. (Woe to Ariel..., Isaiah, 29,1).
Why would Eve not make a counter-bid in the ultimatum game after rejecting
Adam's original bid? Only because the rules forbid it. Rubinstein [1982] (see also
Stahl [1972]) formulated a game without such an artificial constraint. Adam and Eve
alternate in making proposals until a proposal is accepted. Hitherto it has been the
players' attitudes to risk which has been crucial, but now their attitudes to time must
also be considered. As Cross [1969] remarks, "If it did not matter when the parties
agreed, it would not matter whether they agreed at all."
In the discussion that follows, the assumption17 will be that a deal s reached
at time t is worth S tPsl(3) to Adam and 5' 9 p (s) to Eve. The numbers ,( and
6r are therefore discount factors. They are assumed to lie between 0 and 1. The
corresponding discoumnt rates, pa and pjg are defined by lA = ePA^ and bLe = c a. A
time interval of r > 0 is assumed to separate consecutive proposals, the first of which
is made by Adam at time 0. A utility of zero is assigned by both players to the event
that agreement is never reached.
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Rubinstein's result is that such games have a unique subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. (See chapters 3, 5 and 6 of Binmore/Dasgupta [1987]: particularly p.100 for
a quick proof for the current special case.) Rubinstein's model is certainly a natural
one, but it still incorporates unexplained constraints. Why does Adam go first? Why
do the players politely wait their turn? Who chose the time interval of T between
successive proposals?
Such difficulties evaporate when the limiting case r -+ 0+ is considered. This is
the interesting case for a minimizing program because a player will want his or her
next bid on the table as soon as possible after a rejection has been registered. But,
in the limiting case, the problem of who goes first disappears since the first mover
advantage becomes vanishingly small.
The limiting case of Rubinstein's game minimizes on the fictions which need
to be promulgated to explain the behavior of those playing the bargaining game. In
particular, the rules of the game leave players with no obvious motive for cheating.
One does not therefore need to hypothesize exogenously determined penalties for
infringements of the rules. Nor is it necessary to hypothesize an exogenous mechanism
for sustaining commitments. It is therefore a striking vindication of Nash's insight
that the unique equilibrium outcome in the limiting case as -r -+ 0+ is a weighted
Nash bargaining solution. To see this is not hard, given that there is a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium.
With T> 0, let P = (a, b) be the equilibrium outcome in the Rubinstein game
with Adam as first-mover. If Adam's opening proposal is refused, then a subgame is
entered in which Eve is the first-mover. Let Q = (c, d) be the equilibrium outcome
in the Rubinstein gare if Eve were first-mover. Since the subgame after Adam's
opening proposal is refused begins at time t - r, the equilibrium outcome of the
subgamne is necessarily (S6Tc,6S5d). It follows that, in equilibrium, Eve must accept
any proposal (x, y) E X made by Adam for which y > Sid, because the latter is
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what she will get from refusing. Similarly she will refuse if y < 6d. The equilibrium
proposal by Adam must therefore be y = 6'd. Similar considerations apply when it
is Eve who proposes. Thus,
b=6(1d
(5.1)
C = 6r a
Raise both sides of the first of these equations to the power /3 E = 1//)E. Do the same
for the second equation using the power f3A = 1/PA. Multiplying the equations then
yields the result that
and hence the points P = (a, b) and Q = (c, d) both lie on the same contour
xflA y1= =k, where k is a constant. The situation is illustrated in fig.3A (in which
XT = {([xc, S5y)): (x,y) E X}).
Fig.3B shows the limiting case as r -+ 0+. The points P and Q converge to a
common limit n at which a contour xA y,E = k touches the frontier of X. It follows
that n is the weighted Nash bargaining solution for (X, 0) with bargaining powers
1 = 1/PA and 13E = 1/pe.
Figures 3A and 3B here
Aside from providing a minimalist defense of the Nash bargaining solution,
the model also yields some input on the interpretation of the "bargaining powers"
in the asymmetric case. These do not quantify differing bargaining "skills". One
cannot do better than be a rational optimizer, and this is assumed of both players.
The asymmetries, in the Rubinstein game, arise from their differing attitudes to the
unproductive passage of time. The more impatient player has less bargaining power.
For simplicity, la the exarnples which follow, only the symmetric case pa = pzs is
considered.
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6. Impasse and exit. The study of specific bargaining models does more than
provide a rationale for the use of the Nash bargaining solution. It offers clues on ho in
it should be used.
The following example will be relevant to the discussion of bargaining in the
original position which appears in part V of this program of papers. But the story
will be told here in the more familiar circumstances of a wage negotiation.
The first point of interpretation is that bargaining often concerns flows rather
than stocks as has been taken for granted so far. But, since a flow of it utils per
period is equivalent to a utility stock of iu + u6 + u12 +... = u/(1 - 6), where a
fiXe(1 (liscolult, factor of 6 (0 < ( < 1) is assumed, one can easily transfer the analysis
to the language of flows. In particular, there is no difficulty in regarding d as a pair
of utility flows and X as a set of pairs of utility flows when this is convenient.
In a wage negotiation, the set of feasible deals will be derived from the wage and
profit flows that can result from a successful agreement. But what of the disagreement
point d? At least two candidates present themselves. The first candidate will be
called the exit point e. It is the pair of utility flows which will result if the negotiations
are broken off irrevocably as a consequence of one player abandoning the attempt to
reach an agreement and taking up his or her best outside option instead. This will
leave the other player with no choice but to do the same thing. The other candidate
will be called the impasse point i. This is the pair of utility flows that the players
get while they are negotiating but have yet to reach an agreement18 -- i.e. during a
strike. In section 5, i = e = 0.
It is traditional in the labor economics literature to locate the disagreement
point d at the exit point e and then to use the symmetric Nash bargaining solution.
Butt, without implausible commitment assumptions. there is little to be said in favor
of this practice.
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If the Rubinstein bargaining model is modified (as detailed in Binmore/Shaked/
Sutton [1988]) to allow for the possibility of exit, the disagreement point d remains
at the impasse point i as in section 5. The equilibrium outcome n, in the limiting
case r -+ 0+, is the weighted Nash bargaining solution for the problem (Y, i), where
Y = {x : x E X and x > e}, as illustrated in fig.4A for the case p. = Pr.. Observe
that the exit point e serves only as a constraint on the range of validity for the Nash
bargaining solution.
Figures 4A and 4B here
7. Bargaining without trust. What enforces a deal once it has been struck? For
breaches of commercial contracts, a doubtful remedy may be sought via the legal
system. For the social contract, corresponding appeals are usually made to "natural
law". Part I, section 7 explains why I am unwilling to follow this line. In brief,
obligations and duties are part of what a social contract theory should explain. To
embed them in an a priori system of "natural law" is to beg a central question.
This section is therefore concerned with studying deals which are honored
because it is in the interests of the parties to the agreement to honor them-i.e.
the act of honoring the agreement is in equilibrium. Such a requirement has, for
example, implications for the shape of the set X. As explained in part I, section
8(ii), the assumption that X is convex becomes a substantive assumption for which
the justification in the current paper is only that it simplifies the analysis. The
shaded region in fig.4B is the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes 9 for the
Rubinstein bargaining model (in the case PA = PE and r -+ 0-+) for the non-conver
feasible set XT illustrated. One of the problems to be faced without convexity, is
therefore a loss of uniqueness in this model. In persisting with my assumptions on
X, I am therefore guilty of a substantial evasion.
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The shape of X is one problem. But there are others. Consider, in particular,
the following archetypal example of bargaining without trust. Two criminals agree to
exchange a quantity of heroin for a sum of money. The buyer is to end up with the
seller's heroin and the seller with the buyer's money. But how is this transition to
be engineered if each is free to walk away at any time, without penalty, carrying off
whatever is currently in his or her possession?
Obviously, there is no point in the buyer handing over the agreed price and
waiting for the goods. Somehow the criminals have to arrange a flow between them,
so that the money and the drug change hands gradually.2 o Moreover, the rate at
which heroin is exchanged for money at any time must be regulated so that it never he
in the interests of either criminal to call a halt to the exchange in order to renegotiate
the terms of trade. At each time, therefore, the deal which would be negotiated,
given the current distribution of goods, must lead to the same final outcome as the
original deal. Otherwise the agreed final outcome would not have been included in
the feasible set in the first place, there being no viable way of implementing it.
The situation is illustrated in fig.5A. The point co is the original exit point -i.e.
the no-trade point. Trade is seen as the movement of the exit point along a curve
joining eo and the final outcome n. The disagreement point d is not identified with
the no-trade point en. Impasse consists of hanging around on some street corner
dickering, at constant risk of attracting the attention of the ever-vigilant forces of law
and order.2 ' The point e represents a transitional exit point, some money and some
heroin having changed hands. Notice that. with an impasse point i that renaiis
fixed during the transaction, any curve joining n and co along 'which utility iteadily
increases for both Adam and Eve will suffice as a trading path.
Figures 5A and 5B here
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Fig.5B shows a somewhat different situation. Here the utilities are to be
interpreted as flows (rather than stocks as in the heroin-trading example). It
illustrates a species of game played by the workers and the management in operating
a firm. The game is assumed to have many equilibria.2 2 Each point in X corresponds
to the pair of utility flows that results from the choice of a particular equilibrum.
Currently the firm is operating the Pareto-inefficient equilibrium corresponding to io.
Meanwhile management and workers bargain about how to share the surplus that
would result if agreement could be reached on a move to a more efficient equilibrium.
Thus io is the impasse point. A very inferior exit point is indicated at eO. With the
disagreement point at io, the Nash bargaining solution is located at n. How does
the firm get from io to n without the existence of trust between management and
workers?
Such a move will involve the gradual surrender of entrenched privileges and
practices on both sides. Once surrended, these will not necessarily be recoverable
in their old form. If the move to n is broken off before it is completed, perhaps
by one side or the other insisting on a renegotiation, the firm will lapse into a new
equilibrium. The point i in fig.5B corresponds to such an equilibrium. If there is a
renegotiation demand, it will be such a point i that serves as the new impasse point.
The agreement can therefore be seen as a deal to move the impasse point i along a
curve joining i to n. (One should not ask whether such a curve exists: the set X
should be defined as the set of endpoints of such curves).
The requirement that the final outcome originally agreed remains the agreed
final outcome after a renegotiation with a new impasse point i constrains the curve
that can be used to link i and n very sharply. Only a straight line"2 3 will suffice, as
illustrated in fig.5B.
It is this last story which is most relevant to the social contract dliscussion of
part V. What I want to insist upon here is that it is pointless to be using the Nash
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bargaining solution, or any other bargaining solution, without a very clear idea of
the circumstances in which it is to be applied. In particular, it would definitely be
wrong, given the management-worker story that goes with fig.5B, to be placing the
disagreement point at eo-i.e. at the analog of a Hobbesian state-of-nature--unless
commitment assumptions are to be made. This is a point which has been insisted
upon by Buchanan [1975,1976].
8. Continuous exchange. Rubinstein's bargaining model treats the case when no
commitment is possible as the limiting case of a situation when tiny commitments
are possible (lasting for a time period of T). In treating the problem of trustless
cooperation in terms of movement along a continuous path, as in the previous
section, one implicitly relies on a similar modeling device. Each agent is assumed
to be trusting in respect of tiny amounts, and then the limiting case is considered.
However, the game-theoretic considerations are not so straightforward as in the
Rubinstein model.
In the heroin-trading example of the previous section, suppose that the buyer
has $100, each dollar of which is worth only one cent to him if not spent on heroin.
Each unit of heroin purchased by the buyer for one dollar, at the agreed rate of
exchange, is worth only one cent to the seller if not sold to the buyer. Equating utils
with dollars and aping the alternating move structure of the Rubinstein model, one
obtains the game of exchange illustrated in fig.6. At each decision node, the player
whose turn it is to move can choose "across" or "down". To choose "across" is to
make a gift to the other player which is worth one cent to the donor, but one dollar
to the recipient. To choose "down" is to cheat on the arrangement by exiting with
what one' currently has.
This gamie has only one sub~gamne-perfect equililbrillln. This requires b oth piIlayersI~
always to cheat. No trade would then take place. To see this, consider what is optimal
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in the subgame that arises if the rightmost (final) node is reached. The seller must
then choose between 100.01 and 100, and so cheats by choosing the former. In the
sll)galne that arises if the penultimate node is reached, the buyer will predict this
behavior by the seller. He must therefore choose between 99.01 and 99, and so (lcats
by choosing the former. Since the same "backwards induction" argument works at
every decision node, the result of a subgame-perfection analysis is that both )laycrs
plan always to cheat.
Figure 6 here
Does this mean that exchange is not possible without trust? To draw such
a conclusion would be to put more weight on the mathematical model proposed
above than it can bear. The real world is imperfect in many different ways. The
model of fig.6 takes account of the imperfection that money is not infinitely divisible.
But real people are even more imperfect than real money. In particular, they arc
not infinitely discriminating. What is one cent more or less to anybody? Following
Radner [1986], one may seek to capture such an imperfection by looking at E-equilibria
in which players are satisfied to be within e of the optimal payoff. Provided that the
relevant trading unit (one cent in fig.6) is chosen smaller than e, it will then be an
e-equilibrium to honor the deal. One can then proceed to idealize the situation by
allowing c -+ 0+, hence obtaining a continuous2 4 model of trade. Applying this
technique to the ultimatum game at the end of section 4, one finds many e-equilibria.
Adam's ultimatum must take account of the fact that Eve may not accept a proposal
which assigns her e or less. Similarly, there are many E-equilibria in Rubinstein's
model of section 5. In the limit as e -+ 0+, all these equilibria converge on the
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. But this is not true in the trading game of this
section. In particular, honoring the deal is a limit of c-equilibria. For this Ipaper,
nothing more is necessary. Cheating is also the limit of e-equilibria, but it is not a
lirniting equilibriurn on which the agents would wish to coordinate. This rnay leave
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the reader unsatisfied. Is cheating really viable for rational players? Perhaps towards
the end of the game: but surely not right from the beginning? This is essentially the
same question that arises in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Indeed, the trading
game of this section was introduced by Rosenthal [1981] as a simplified version of
the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. It is generally agreed that game theory has yet to
provide an adequate resolution of the difficulties raised by such examples. My own
view [Binmore,1987] is that a resolution depends on taking what it means to be an
imperfect human being very much more seriously than is customary. Playing around
with E-equilibrium sheds light on only one small corner of the mystery. Fortunately
for these papers, this is the corner in which we are sitting.
9. Information. This is a large subject on which only very little will be said.
One large evasion throughout these papers will be that only games of complete
information are ever considered. Players always know the rules of the game and
the tastes and beliefs of their opponents. However, information is not necessarily
perfect-i.e. players will not necessarily know the full history of moves in the game
so far. Nor are chance moveS excluded.
These last points are essential in modeling the Rawlsian original position.
Players 1 and 2 are hypothesized as bargaining behind a veil--of-yignorance which
conceals their real-life roles as Adam or Eve. They treat these roles as being
determined by a chance move which attaches a probability of 1/2 to each of the two
possible role-assignments. The intuition is that deals reached in the original position
will then be "fair". (See Part I for an extended discussion). Information is imperfect
in the original position because it is players 1 and 2 who are making decisions and
their tastes and beliefs, while making the decisions, are asslumed to b)e commonIU1
knowledlge. A better theory would leave room for incomplete information in tihe
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original position. But progress in this direction must await a more solidly founded
theory of bargaining with incomplete information than is currently available.
These clarifying remarks are necessary in order to clear the air for a brief
discussion of a rather different informational question. In section 2, the weighted
Nash bargaining solution was characterized by three axioms. But there is a
further "implicit axiom". It is that the bargaining solution should depend only
on the mathematical entity (X, d). Information which is abstracted away in this
idealization of the bargaining problem is to be suppressed altogether. It is tempting
to follow Harsanyi [1977,p118] in brushing aside the relevance of other parameters as
"strategically irrelevant". Those who find this airy defense adequate are invited to
skip forward to section 11.
Interest in these matters has been revived by RPoeiner [1988], but it is earlier
work which will be significant here. I am particularly concerned to clarify the relation
between the Nash bargaining solution and a Walrasian allocation. The latter is what
results from trading at market-clearing prices in an exchange economy. It is therefore
a concept which lies close to the heart of conservative thinkers.
10. Walrasian solution. Fig.7A shows an Edgeworth box representing a two-person
trading situation with two commodities, wheat and fish. The no-trade or endowment
point is located at e. There is a unique Walrasian outcome at w. The slope of the
line joining c and w is -p, where p is the clearing price of fish in terms of wheat.
The symmetry of the configuration implies that the allocation corresponding to the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution lies at n (provided that the disagreement point,
which need not be at e, is symmetrically located).
Figures 7A and 7B here
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In section 2, a "bargaining problem" was narrowly defined as a pair (X, d).
But this conventional definition is an uncomfortable straitjacket which is abandoned
in what follows. This makes it possible to regard the Walrasian outcome in the
Edgeworth box of fig. 7A as a type of bargaining sobuion. As such, it differs from the
Nash bargaining solution in taking account of a wider informational base. It depends,
not only on utility information, but on all the information in the Edgeworth box."
In chapter 10 of Binmore/Dasgupta [1987] (also Gevers [1986]), it is argued that
a Walrasian outcome is, in fact, the appropriate extension of the symmetric Nash
bargaining solution to such an expanded informational base.
Recall, from section 2, the proposition characterizing the weighted Nash bar-
gaining solution. What follows is an expanded and amended list of the characterizing
properties:
1. Strong individual rationality
2. Independence of utility cirul commodity calibration2
3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives2 7
4. Pareto-efficiency
5. Symmetry
An analog of the proposition of section 2 can now be stated. The analog
concerns functions f which map each Edgeworth box into an allocation in the box. If
such a function satisfies properties 1-5, then its values are Walrasian.
Bargaining solutions are under discussion in this paper because it is necessary
to resolve the bargaining problem faced by those in the original position. Which
bargaining solution is chosen will depend on what is hypothesized about the
circumstances of those in the original position. Part I took the view that the
usefulness of the device of the original position depends on miznimizing the tictionis t~o
be promulgated. Hence the concern in the current paper with whether the rules of a
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given bargaining procedure would or would not be honored if there were no penalties
for cheating.
Given this attitude, a critic might quote the characterization of the Wairasian
correspondence given above, or some other such result, and challenge the use of the
Nash bargaining solution in the original position. Why should those in the original
position be denied information about the actual physical goods that equity may
require to be redistributed? Such critics may include, not only those for whom
defell(lilg the market mechanism is a knee-jerk reflex, but also those who have sought
to characterize equity in terms of envy-free allocations (e.g. Varian [1974,19851,
Thomson and Varian [1984]).
An allocation is envy-free if no individual would wish to swop the bundle
of resources allocated to him or her with that allocated to someone else. In a
simple exchange economy, like that considered above, an envy-free allocation may be
obtained as follows. First confiscate all the original endowments and then redistribute
these so that each agent gets an equal amount of each commodity. This creates a ne-w
nd(lowImleilt [)oint ce as illustrated in fig.7B. The Walrasian allocation relative to this
new endowment point e is then envy-free. Thus w in fig.7B is one of the envy-free
allocations.
Such criteria evade the vexed question of how inter-personal comparisons of
utility should be made (section 9 and part I, section 6). But the evasion entails a
heavy cost, as examples like the following make clear. A benefactor presents two
bottles of vermouth and twenty bottles of gin to Adam and Eve on condition that
they agree on how to split the donation between them. Adam mixes Martinis only
in the ratio of 1 part of verrnouth to 100 parts of gir. Eve rixes Martinis only in
the ratio of 1 part of verrnouth to 10 parts of gin. Neither has any use for gin or
vermouth beyond mixing such Martinis. An equal split of the donation gives 1 bot tie
of Vermouth and 10 bottles of gin to each. Any trade rnakes Eve worse off and hence
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no trade will take place. That is to say, the equal-split endowment is already the
Wairasian allocation. But one can hardly say that it is "fair" in any meaningful
sense. It is true that Adam does not envy Eve's allocation and that Eve does not
envy Adam's, but Eve is able to enjoy 10 times as many Martinis as Adam.
But it is not adequate simply to criticize potential critics. It remains necessary
to offer some justification for neglecting all but utility information. A consideration
of what is involved in implementing the Walrasian solution zv in fig.7A will assist in
clarifying this point. The simplest bargaining model that does the trick is an analog
of the Nash demand game. But, instead of utility demands, the players announce the
maximum amount they are willing to trade of the good they wish to sell, and the
minimum rate (price) at which they will exchange this good for the good they wish to
buy. Trade is then assumed to take place at the maximum volume consistent with the
announced constraints. In fig.8A, the set C represents the set of allocations consistent
with Crusoe's announcement, and F the set consistent with Friday's announcement.
The set of allocations consistent with both is C n F. The allocation representing
maximal trade in this set is v. A Pareto-efficient, Nash equilibrium in ths game is
necessarily Walrasian. The sets C* and F* in fig.SA represent equilibrium strategies.
(Chapter 10 of Biarnore/Dasgupta [1987]).
Figures 8A and 8B
The next step is to indicate what strategies in this primitive trading game look
like in terms of utilities. Fig.SB illustrates the set U of utility pairs corresponding
to the set C of allocations in fig.8A. A strategy in the trading game amounts to
derandirg a utility pair in such a set U. All that needs to be observed is that, if
Crusoe picks such a demand set, Friday would definitely not wish to be restricted to
picking a dernand set of a similar odd shape. In the circumstances of the original
position, tocnii rdyi hsway would be to conflict with the rnizingz
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principle on unexplained fictions. The moral of the story is intended to be that, unless
unexplained constraints are imposed on those in the original position, information
other than utility information will be irrelevant, just as Harsanyi was quoted- as
saying towards the end of section 8.
11. Utilitarian solution. This is usually treated as a social choice rule, rather than
a bargaining solution, as in Thomson [1081]. That is to say, given a feasible set X,
the utilitarian solution is normally identified with the point x in X at which xA + E
is maximized. The treatment of this section takes as fundamental, not just a feasible
set X, but a pair (X, d). The set X has the same interpretation as in the case of the
Nash bargaining solution (section 2), with the gloss that it will be assumed strictly
convex (to assure that the utilitarian solution gets defined uniquely). However, d will
no longer be interpreted as a disagreement point, but as a disagreementdirection.2s
Only the interesting case d > 0 will be considered.
Fig.9A illustrates the weighted utilitarian solution u for the problem (X, d)
corresponding to the weights WA > 0 and wE > 0. This is the value of x = (xaA, X E)
at which the "weighted sum"
WAXA WEZCE
dA dE
is maximized subject to the requirement that x E X. Notice that only the ratio
w:1 d E/wEdA is significant. Notice also the close resemblance between the form of the
definition and that given for the weighted Nash bargaining solution in section 2.
Figures 0A and 0B here
This resemblance is no accident. Recall the proposition of section 2 that
characterizes the Nash bargaining solution. If property 1 is replaced by Pareto-
efficiency and (X, d) is reinterpreted as in the current section, then the pro position
characterizes the weighted utilitarian solution. Not only this, a simple adaptation of
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the Rubinstein bargaining game of section 5 leads to a utilitarian outcome. Suppose
that a deal s reached at time 4 is not evaluated, as in section 5, as equivalent to the
utility pair ( 5Yp i(+), SPE(s)), but as equivalent to (g(s) - tcA, E(s) ~- tcj). That
is to say, the players (1o not discouni the unproductive passage of time but pay a fixed-
cost per unit of time lost. Recall that r denotes the time interval between successive
proposals. In the limiting case when r -+ 0-i-, the unique subgarne-perfect equilibriuan
outcome converges on the unweighted utilitarian solution with c = (ci, c,) as the
disagreement directiono It is such models that motivate the interpretation of the
line marked "disagreement path" in fig.9A. If agreement were indefinitely deiayed
but rational behavior were always anticipated in the future, the expected (leal would
recede along the disagreement path towards an "infinitely distant impasse".
An intuition for the result can be obtained by supposing the existence of
discount factors 6A < 1 and 6 E < 1 along with the fixed costs. Adam's impasse payoff
is then
-crA{l+}-i6+6 + ... } = -c/(1 - )-- -CA/P/ as r -+ 0+.
Following the principle of section 6, one should therefore employ the weighted Nash
bargaining solution with bargaining powers /3A = 1/pA and fl =l/p;, locating
the disagreement point at d = (-cA/pai, -cE/PE). Now let PA--+ 0+ and PE -+ 0+
in such a way that p//pE --+ 'WE IWA. The solution then converges to the weighted
utilitarian solution for the problem (X, c) with weights w- and wE as illustrated in
fig.DD.
In part , section 2, Harsanyi's [1977] defense of utilitarianism as "fair" was
dlescribed. In the version given of his argument, the Nash bargaining solution was
used'( to resoIlve the b argainling p)rob~leni faced b)y those ini the original po)sitionI. Buti
the aim is to achieve a utilitarian outcome, why fuss about with the original positioni
in the first place? Why not allow Adam and Eve to bargain -without conhcealingf
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their identities and resolve their bargaining problem using the utilitarian solution
directly? I believe that to ask this question is to misunderstand the whole nature of
the enterprise. Bargaining solutions are not like ready-made suits. You cannot g)
into a shop anl biy whichever takes your fancy. A bargaining solution nd(ls to be
carefully tailored to the problem it supposedly resolves. The Nash program is a tool
for checking how well a bargaining solution fits a particular problem. What it tells
us about the utilitarian solution is that it is a hopeless misfit for Adam and Eve's
problem. Other issues aside, they begin with a disagreement point (corresponding to
the state-of-nature): not a disagreement direction.
12. Inter-personal comparison. This subject has already been introduced in the
martini example of section 9. Who gets how many martinis is clearly relevant to
what is or is not "fair". But suppose Adam likes Martinis very much more than Eve.
Perhaps Eve then "deserves" more Martinis to compensate for this disadvantage. Or
perhaps Adam should get all the Martinis to maximize total "welfare". It is clear
that some theory of inter-personal comparison of utility is necessary to tackle such
issues conveniently. The orthodox methodology, on which my approach is founded,
employs the notion of "extended sympathy" as described in part I, sections 4-6. The
current section reviews some of the primitive ideas.
In part I, section 4, two states h (hell) and H (heaven) are introduced to anchor
the utility scales. Adam's and Eve's utility functions are then normalized so that
cpA(h) = WE(h) = 0 and <jA(H) = pE(H) = 1. Can we now say that both
players will have gained equally if they find themselves both in heaven rather than in
hell? Obviously not, since the calibration of utility scales using the two benchmark
states is entirely arbitrary.
Sometimes, such considerations are allowed to confuse bargaining discussions.
For example, the status quo state so (section 2) in a Nash bargaining context is said
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to provide a "natural" hell-point - i.e. a location for the zero point on the players'
utility scales. Often, this is expressed by saying that the description of the bargaining
problem determines a "natural" comparison of utility levels.
The same trick may be played with the utilitarian solution. Rather than using
a disagreement point to provide a "natural" comparison of leoc ls, the <lisagreemcnt
direction may be used to provide a "natural" comparison of utility units.
If one were provided with both a disagreement point and a disagreement
direction then one would have a "natural" comparison of both utility levels and utility
units. Thus a full inter-personal comparison of utilities would be achieved. Fig.10A
illustrates the bargaining solution that would necessarily result from maintaining the
interpretations of disagreement point and disagreement direction used in this paper.
The result is called a proportional bargaining solution in the literature (Raiffa [19531,
Isbel [1960], Kalai [1977], Myerson [1977], Roth [1979]). The axiomatization which
perhaps best captures the fact that utility scales are to be deemed as fully tied down
is that of Peters [1986].
Figures 10A and 10B here
Returning to the case of the Nash bargaining solution, consider the following
piece of window-dressing. Having located the hell-point at the status quo, it is
"natural" to locate the heaven-point at the state t implemented by the Nash
bargaining solution. This is, after all, the best that rational bargainers can achieve.
Hence so the argument goes, the Nash bargaining solution is "fair" because each
bargainer gains one util.
Although I agree that this naive argument has no merit, I do think that it makes
good sense to seek to enidogenfize the issue of inter-p~ersonal comparison, along the
lines explainedl in Part I. I also b)elieve that a conicrt-dependent notion of "fairness"'
should not b)e too quickly rejected. Real-world usages certainly have this property.3 '
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The naive argument is offered in protest against the uise of the word "natural" to
disguise statements which are not even clearly meaningful. In the Von Neumann and
Morgenstern theory, the natural (i.e. primitive) entities are preference relations. The
utility functions are simply mathematical constructs and their properties should be
deduced from properties of the primitives of the theory - i.e. the preference relations.
The fact that it is a fallacy to argue that an agent prefers x to y because p(X) > cp(y)
is widely understood. When it is argued that a deal is "fair" because of inter-personal
comparison reasons, I believe we should suspect that a similar fallacy is in train.
A critic might respond that this is all very well for Von Neumann and
Morgenstern utility functions, which are derived from attitudes to risk. These are
essential for an approach based on the original position, because of the hypothetical
chance move which determines who occupies which role. But suppose that the
utilities are hypothesized as representing "levels of desert" or "intensities of need".
My response to this is that one simply cannot announce that such an interpretation
is to be made. A theory, analogous to that of Von Neumann and Morganstern, needs
to be provided which explains the principle by means of which these fuzzy notions
are to be measured on a scale like temperature. How else is one to know what value
judgements may or may not be hidden in the woodwork?
13. Kalai/Smorodinsky solution. (And Elud said, I have a message..., Judge., 3, 20)
Given a Nash bargaining problem (X, d), begin by calculating the most to which
each player can aspire. This is the largest payoff consistent with the other player
getting at least his or her disagreement payoff. The resulting payoff pair i will be
called the ideal point. Next construct a "disagreement path" by joining d and i with
a straight line. The Kalai/Smorodinsky solution k is located where this line crosses
the Pareto-frontier of X, as shown in fig.10B.
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Similar bargaining solutions (with different ideal points) appear in Part VI.
However, in this section I want to argue against using the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution
as an alternative to the Nash bargaining solution. Gauthier [1086], for example, seeks
to justify this practice by using an idiosyncratic version of Zeuthen's principle.
However, I do not see why the concession stage of his process is not essentially a Nash
demand game and the claim stage therefore irrelevant.
What of Kalai and Smorodinsky's [1975] defense? They have no bargaining
models, only axioms. Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives is replaced by a
morotonicity axiom (usually now called "individual monotonicity"). Suppose that
the disagreement and ideal points are left fixed, but the feasible sets change so that,
for each of Eve's possible utility demands, there will be more left in the new situation
for Adam if he concedes the demand than there would have been in the old situation.
The monotonicity axiom says that Adam should get more in the new situation than
in the old. The grounds are that his bargaining position has improved. But what
basis is there for this claim? It is certainly false as a general proposition. The Nash
and Rubinstein bargaining models provide couiter-examples. Models do exist in
which the claim is valid. The model of Moulin [19841 mentioned in section 4 provides
an example. But such models are remote from those that come immediately to mind
in a bargaining context.
14. Morals by agreement. This section itemizes the cornerstones of the theory
that Gauthier [1986] espouses in has book "Morals by Agreement". His aims coincide
with mine but we differ radically on several vital points in seeking to achieve this
aim, and hence in the conclusions at which we arrive. The current section attempts
to clarity the points of difference by considering lbriefly each of the five "conceptions"
that Gauthier regards as basic to his approach [1986, pp13 -17 ]. These are taken in
reverse order from that in which he introduces them.
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1. The Archimedean Point. The first notion is that of an "Archincdean point"
[Rawls, 1971, p584] from which perspective moral issues can be viewed impartially.
That is to say, some analog of the Rawlsian original position is required. I agree
wholeheartedly with Gauthier that it is not satisfactory to examine the ccrludlsions
that an "ideal observer" would reach under such conditions of impartiality. A rational
bargaining analysis would seem necessary if the results are to be convincing.
2. The state of nature. The second notion concerns the status quo from which
bargaining begins in Gauthier's story. I agree that to neglect consideration of this
point would be a serious defect. Wolff [1977] has been forceful in criticizing Rawls on
this issue, and a similar criticism can be directed at Harsanyi [1977]. Neither Rawls
nor Harsanyi see any necessity to refer to an original "state of nature" and hence
individual rationality constraints do not arise in their treatments.
However, I am not comfortable with the manner in which Gauthier envisages
the "initial bargaining position" being selected [1986, p190]. Although it is easy to
see why he wishes to introduce the criteria he proposes, the arguments offered in
defense of the criteria seem to me to have an ad hoc flavor. I am not even comfortable
with the idea that the initial bargaining position should be seen as an object that can
be selected. To my mind, the manner in which the Archimedean point is specified
should render the initial bargaining position inevitable.
There is also a minor technical point that arises on this topic. In part I, it was
explained how the use of Nash's threat game will lead to a Hobbesian state-of-nature
being used as status quo under appropriate circumstances. However, I do not believe
that the Nash threat game is an appropriate tool for use in the original position
because of its reliance on commitment assumptions (see item 3 below). But Gauthier
[1986, p200] is not entitled to dismiss the approach as he does in the following quote:
.. fortunately we need not face the problem of determining
maximally effective threat strategies ... They play a purely
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hypothetical role in the Nash-Harsanyi analysis. since Ann and
Adam do not actually choose them ... But if Ann and Adam
would not choose these strategies, then they cannot credibly
threaten with them. Maximally effective threat strategies prove
to be idle.
If such arguments concerning the use of credible threats were valid, game theorists
would have to abandon concepts like that of subgame-perfect equilibrium. It is trie
that rational bargainers never actually employ the threat strategies that they commnit
themselves to use if agreement should fail to be reached. This is because rational
bargainers always reach agreement in this story. But what they agree on (lepenids
on what would happen if they were to fail to agree. That is to say, it depends on
the threats the players have made in advance. As always, the reason the players stay
on the equilibrium path is because of what they anticipate happening if they were
to deviate. Since rational players never deviate, what would happen if they were
to deviate always remains hypothetical. But it is far from irrelevant to their actual
behavior.
3. Commitment. The third notion is that of "constrained inaxinization". It
is true that "1b)et ter" societies could 1e designed if it were possible for individuals to
make unbreakable commitments that constrained their future behavior. Moreover,
there is no shortage of situations in which individuals, either acting alone or as part
of a group, would find it in their interests to make such commitments. What I
believe to be indefensible is the proposition that such commitments can be lmade in
the absence of a suitable enforcement mechanism. Without such a mnechanism, any
hypothetical agreements reached in an analog of the original position will have to
be self -policing. That is to say, only equtilibrriL will be available as the objects of a
ratl inal agreemen ivt. OnIe mIay seek to ivd thl 1 iis adm111it tedly v unpalatabl e onc~Ilusion1
by postulating "natural laws" that serve to police hypothetical agreements that are
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not self-policing. But this does not advance matters very far. since the policing of
the natural laws themselves is still left unexplained.
This issue seems to me to be central for a social contract theory. However, the
preceding paragraph is all that will be offered on the subject here. More is said in
part I of the sequence of papers of which this is part II. In brief. I think Hume [1739.,
1)2801 was right in saying:
What theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless
it can show that all the duties it recommends are also in the
true interst of each individual?
Gauthier [1986, p1] makes this his opening sentence as a proposition requiring
immediate denial.
4. Bargaining. The fourth notion is Gauthier's concept of "minimax relative
concession" from which he deduces a 1)argaining solution equivalent to that of Kalai
and Sinorodinsky [1977] in two-person situations. The bulk of this paper has been
devoted to expounding the orthodoxy he thereby outrages. In so far as it was ever
the case that this orthodoxy was the "Nash-Harsanyi-Zeuthen" theory that he offers
as the principle alternative his account of rational bargaining [1986, p1 3 3 ], this is no
longer true. It is correct that it remains orthodox to defend the Nash Bargaining
Solution, but the basis for this defense is now very much more securely grounded in
non-cooperative game theory. In particular, it is no longer considered adequate to
appeal to ad hoc criteria like "Zeuthen's Principle".
Gauthier [1986. p133] envisages rational bargaining as a two-stage process in
which each bargainer makes a claim followed by a concession. Suppose there are
just two bargainers whose utilities for the initial bargaining position are i* and
u*. Each is then seen as making a claim, uf and uLf. The rational claims, so
Gauthier asserts, are those that maximize fanu subject to the requirement that
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(u *, u) and (ut, u2) correspond to feasible agreements. The bargainers then make
concessions according to an unspecified process. This leads to agreement on a utility
pair (t 1 , u,). Gauthier defines the "relative magnitude of a player's concession' as
ct = (u. - us)/(u# - utt). He emphasizes the scale-invariance of this quantity. He
next insists that rational bargainers will select (ui, u.2) so as to ensure that the larger
of c1 and c2 is minimized. This is the "principle of minimax relative concession'.
His defense of this last requirement is very brief. He asserts [1986. p1431 that
the condition
. .. expresses the equal rationality of the bargainers. Since each
person, as a utlity-maximizer, seeks to minimize his concession,
then no one can expect any other rational person to be willing
to make a concession if he would not be willing to make a
similar concession.
In this quote, the word"concession" is used in two different senses. At its first
appearance, no more tham Gauthier's algebraic defintion seems to be intended.
It is, of course, tautologous that a maximizer of u; is a minimizer of ci. At its
later appearances, it has acquired a more complex meaning that needs more careful
examination.
It is certainly attractive to entertain the proposition that no rational person
would expect another rational person to take an action that he himself would not
take under identical circumstances. Having granted this, it is tempting to extend tlhe
proposition by requiring that no rational person would expect another rational IpersCon
to take an action that lie himself ;would not take under eqLi1)(l1ernt circumstances.
The question then arises: when are the circumstances under which rational players
ope(rate equivalent? Gauthier's answer seems to he: when the sets of cOnciCS5ons5
from wich(1 they choose are fthe :;nm, other structure being irrelevant . It m ayb
that such a proposition could be (defended if the definition of the word "conciCSioni
were tailored to the situation. But Gauthier offers no dlefense at all for the use of his
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simple algebraic definition in this context. It is, indeed, difficult to see what form
such a defense would take without specific reference being made to the concession
strategies available to the players.
One route might be to suppose that, after making their claims, each player
simultaneously announces a take-it-or-leave-it concession. But with such a model,
it is difficult to see why the final outcome would be as sensitive to the initial claims
as Gauthier requires. Indeed, since the initial claims in Gauthier's story are entirely
stereotyped, it is not clear why he accords them so much prominence. Rational
players have no need to interchange information that is common knowledge between
them already.
5. Morally-free zone. Gauthier [1986, p13] argues that a perfectly competitive
market constitutes a morally-free zone. The view seems to be based on the observation
that a Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto-efficient.
I do not want to comment on this point in the specific context of Gauuthier's
argument, where it seems to me to be something of a side-show. But it does seem
worthwhile to take the opportunity of forestalling some misunderstandings that such
a view may provoke.
Both Gauthier and I are concerned with "morals by agreement". Although the
arguments may be couched in abstract terms, the question being asked is essentially
a practical one: how can we get from where we are to somewhere better by mutual
consent. This is to take a much narrower view then is commonplace of what
appeals to morality can realistically achieve. with my view being substantially more
pessimistic than Gauthier's. My approach is to model the circumstances under which
societies operate as a game, and to see morality as a system of rules for selecting andi
sustaining e:quilibria in that game. I have my doubts about the extent to which a free
market in which large numbers of agents persistently end up with inadequate access
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to basic necessities can be said to be "in equilibrium". Why should the have-nots feel
constrained to honor the property rights of the haves if they have the power to do
something about it? This, however, is to quibble. What is important is that a system
of morals that operates by mutal cons ent cannot shift society from a Pareto-efficient
equilibrium 1because at least one person would be made worse off and hence would
not cooperate.3 2 The most that one can ask of a practical system of morals in a
rational society is that it provide guidance while society is shifting from an inefficient
equilibrium to an efficient one. I am aware that such a view leads to conclusions that
sound more than a little Panglossian. But it seems to me that this is inevitable if
morality is to be treated as one of the "arts of the possible".
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Footnotes
1. "Egalitarian" is not intended here in a technical sense. Thus, Rawl's [1972]
difference principle is deemed to be egalitarian.
2. Although Rawls would deny this.
3. Alekhine is reported as saying, "Position, what does position matter? It
is my will that counts." To model him as homo ecornomicus would therefore be as
fruitless as to do the same for the chimpanzee.
4. The set S should be assumed to be closed under the formation of lotteries
when deals based on these are feasible so that attitudes to risk are properly taken
account of.
5. The formal definitions are: (1) Closed: X contains its boundary points;
(2) Bounded above: there is a vector b such that x E X implies x < b; (3) Convex: if
X contains x and y, then it contains the line segment joining them; (4) Comprehensive:
if X contains x and y, then x <z y implies z E X.
6. Arrow's theorem is not immediately applicable. For one thing, the condition
of unrestricted domain is not appropriate here. Thus, for a fixed d, it is possible to
construct a collective preference relation on {xa: x > d}. With properties 1,2 and 3 of
the proposition, the indifference curves have the form (z1 t-d:)i
3 a (xE- - dE)3E -=con-
stant. But then Adam and Eve would be prepared separately to take risks that they
would reject collectively. This seems unacceptable.
7. For those familiar with Maskin's [1985] monoionicity, a preference relation
can be defined on {x : x > d} as follows. Make Adam indifferent between L and any
x X (i.e. any non-feasible payoff pair). If x and y are both in X, make Adam
strictly prefer . to y if and only if - > y. Proceed similarly for Eve. With these
preferences, the independence of irrelevant alternatives follows from monotonicity.
8. See Maskin [1985] atnd Moore/Repuilo [19S8]. Abren/Sen [1987) miagests
that matters are perhaps more complex.
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9. Section 2 does not say that utility scales should not be used: only that they
should not be abused.
10. If the choice of incompatible demands led to the payoff pair d. the result
would be the same except that (Y, 0) becornes (Yd). Technical matters are discusse1
in chapters 4 and 8 of Binmore/Dasgupta [1987], especially pp.159-1G7 . See also
Carlsson [1087].
11. Sometimes, it is argued that Nash's axioms should be construed as .selcction
critCTa for this situation. This is a coherent view, but not one that is very helpful inl
the current context. Why these selection criteria and not others?
12. This is a lot of supposing. A more careful discussion is really necessary here.
13. Which may itself be a lottery.
14. One is not entitled to argue that she would not want to accept a "derisory"
offer. She is hyjpothesized to be a. maximizer of expected utility. In real life, she
might easily turn down a derisory monetary offer in favor of nothing without being
irrational. But this would imply that her utility for the latter option was greater in
the circumstances of the decision.
15. If Adam is able to make arbitrarily low offers, Eve will actually get nothing
at all in equilibTium. It cannot be optimal to offer Eve even a tiny amount if she is
going to accept half as much. Of course, in real-life, goods come in discrete units.
16. Whether or not, the subgame will actually be reached in equilibrium.
Binmore [1087] warns against an vrcritical espousal of the idea.
17. Fishburn and Rubinstein [19821 give axioms relating to attitudes to time
(rather than risk, a la Von Neumann and Morgenstern) which justify such functional
forrns.
18. The impasse point can be neatly chai-acterized as follows. If thme barg~ainers
agreed upon the impasse point, they would not care :vien rthey agreed1 upon it.
(Binmor/Rubinstein/Wolinsky [19861).
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19. See chapter 5 of Bininore/Dasgupta [1987].
20. Or to be more accurate, so that control over the money and drug changes
hands continuously. One sometimes sees exchanges in the street in which the traders
grasp both of the objects being exchanged and gradually relinquish the firmnness of
their hold. Of course, in real-life, there is always the threat of physical violence in
the background.
21. Suppose Adam attaches utility bA to being picked up by the police at time
o while engaged in a drug transaction. If the probability of this happening in any
time interval of length r is irr, then iA = bA7rr{1 + (1 - r7)6j + (1 - rr)2r +
... } = b47r|/{1 -(1 - r)S} -+ bAr/(pA +7r) as-r -+ 0+.
22. Only stationary equilibria are considered.
23. This is the same straight line which appears when Zeuthen's principle is
used, but I do not see that much significance can be attached to this.
24. Why not model directly in continuous time? In brief, one cannot do this
directly, as Shubik [19 8 3 ,p6O] proposes, because mathematical coherence then requires
a well-ordering structure on each play of the game. One may turn to the theory
of differential games within which all is mathematically sound. But one does not
escape the necessity of considering imperfections. These simply find their way into
the specification of the state equations where they are hard to evaluate.
25. Which is to be understood as encompassing not only a region in commodity
space but also Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions on this region.
26. Independence of commodity calibration means that the solution should not
depend on the units in which commodities are measured.
27. See chapter 10 of Binmore/Dasupta [1987].
28. When a vector d is used in physics to specify a (direction. the formal
understanding is that it is a representative oi the equivalence class D = {,\d+ :A, > 0
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and e E R2} . Thus, in section 10, (X, d) is to be understood as shorthand for what
is forrrally (XD).
20. S trong individual rationality is not meaningful when there is no disagreeluenit
point.
30. See chapter 5 of Binmore/Dasgupta [1987]. Rubinstein [1982] uses the
filxed-cost case to illustrate the existence of multiple equilibria, but his X is theniu( nt
strictly convex.
31. See Biamore/Shaked/Sutton [1988] for some experimental evidence.
32. One should not be naive about what is subsumed under the notion of an
equilibrium. It will not usually be in equilibrium for the wicked to go unfettered
about their business if their behavior is sufficiently offensive to those about th1ern1
provided that the latter have the power to interfere. Nor will there usually be reason
to curlb the activities of those who have a proclivity for altruism. However, evcrytjbody,
both wicked and saintly, will be cooperating in sustaining the equilibrium because it
is in what they see as their interests to do so.
13
References
D. Abreu and A. Sen [1987], "Virtual implementation in Nash equilibrium," mimco,
Harvard University.
K. Binrnore [1984], "Game theory and the social contract I," ICERD discussionI paper
84/108, London School of Economics.
K. Binmore [1087], "Modeling Rational Players I," J. Econ. and Phil.
K. Binmore [1988], "Game theory and the social contract II," ICERD discussion
paper 88/170, London School of Economics.
K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta [1987], The economics of bargaining, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford.
K. Binmore, A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky [1986], "The Nash bargaining solution
in economic modeling, "RAND. J. of Econ. 17, 176-187.
1K. Binmore, A. Shaked and J. Sutton [1988a], "An outside option experiment,"
mineo, London School of Economics.
K. Binrnore, A. Shaked and J. Sutton [1988b], "Do people exploit their bargaining
power?" forthcoming.
J. Buchanan [1975], The limits of liberty, U. of Chicago Press, Chicago.
J. Buchanan [1976], "A Hobbsian interpretation of the Rawlsian difference principle",
Kyklos 29, 5-25.
H. Carlsson [1987], "A bargaining model where parties make errors," discussion
paper, University of Lund, Sweden.
J. Cross [1969], The economics of bargaining, Basic Books, New York.
P. Dasgupta, P. Hammond and E. Maskin [1979], "The implementation of social
choice rules: some general results in incentive compatibility, Review Econ.
Studies, 46 185-216.
P. Fishburn and A. Rubinstein [1982], "Time preference," Int. Econ. Review, 23,
677 --694.
D. Gauthier [1986], Morals by agreement, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
L. Gevers [1986], "Walrasian social choice: some simple axiomatic approaches", Social
Choice and Public Decision Making, Essays in Honor of Kenneth .. Arrow. Vol.
1, ed. W. Heller. R. Starr, D. Starre H, C.U.P., Cambridge.
J. Harsanyi [1953], "Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of
risk-taking," J. Political Econ. 61, 434-435.
J. Harsanvi [19551, "Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics. and interpersonal
compariscns of utility," J. Political Econ. 63. 309-321.
.J. Harsanyi [1958], "Ethics in terms of hypothetical imperatives"', Mind 47, 305-316.
J. H arsanyi [1977], IRaional behavior and bargaining equiuibrium in games and sociat
situations, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge.
44
.1. Isbell [1960]. "A modification of Harsanyi's bargaining model," Bull. Amer. Math.
Soc. 66, 70-73.
E. Kalai [1977], "Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: interpersonal utility
comparisons," Econometrica 45, 1623-1630.
E. Kalai and M. Smorodensky [1975], "Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problem,"
Economctrica 45, 1623-1630.
E. Maskin [1985], "The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium: a sir-
vey," in Social goals and social organization ed. L. Hurwicz, D. Schleidler.
H. Sonnenschein, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge.
J. Moore and P. Repullo [1988], "Nash implementation: a full characterization",
ST/ICE R.D working paper TE/88/175, London School of Economics.
H. Moulin [1984], "Implementing the Kalai-Smnorodinsky bargaining solution," J.
Econ. Th. 33, 32-45.
R. Myerson [1977], "Two-person bargaining and comparable utility," Econornetrica
45, 1631-1637.
J. Nash [19501, "The bargaining problem," Econometrica 18, 155-162.
J. Nash [1951], "Non-cooperative games," Annals of Math. 54, 286-295.
J. Nash [1953], "Two person cooperative games," Econometrica 21, 129-40.
H. Peters [1986], Bargaining game theory, Proefschritt Universitat Nijmegen, Nether-
lands.
R. Radner [1986], "Can bounded rationality resolve the Prisoners' Dilemma?"
Essays in Honour of Gerard Debren, eds. A. Mass-Collel and W. Hildenbrand,
North-Holland, Amsterdam.
H. Raiffa [1953], "Arbitration schemes for generalized two-person games," Contri-
butions to the Theory of Games II, ed. Kuhn and Tucker, Princeton U.P.,
Princeton.
J. Rawls [1958], "Justice as fairness," Phil. Review 57.
J. Rawls [1068], "Distributive justice: some addenda," Natural Lain Forum 13.
J. Rawls [1972], A theory of justice, Oxford U.P., Oxford.
J. Roemer [1988], "Axiomatic bargaining theory in economic environments", J. Econ.
Th., forthcoming.
R. Rosenthal [1981], "Games of perfect information. predatory pricing and the
chain-store paradox." .1. Econ. Th. 25, 92-100.
A. Roth [1970], Aziomatic models of bargaining, Lecture notes in economics ;ud
mathematical systems 170, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
A. Rubinstein [1982], "Perfect equilibrium in a b~argaininhg model," Econometrica 50,
97-100.
T. Schelinig [1960], The 'stracgy of conjhici. Harvard U.P.. Canbridge. Mass.
R1. Selten [1975], "Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium in
extensive-form garnes', Int. J1. Game. Th. 4, 25-55.
45
M. Shubik [1983], Game theory in the social sciences: concepts and solitions, M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge, Mass.
I. Stahl [1972], Bargaining theory, Economics Research Institute, Stockholm.
R. Sugden [1986J, The economics of rights, cooperation and 'welfare, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford.
W. Thomson [1981], "Nash's bargaining solution and utilitarian choice rules,"
Econometrica 49, 535-538.
W. Thomson and H. Varian [1984], "Theories of justice based on symmetry."
H. Varian [1974], "Equity, envy and efficiency," J. Econ. Th. 9, 63-91.
H. Varian [1985], "Dworkin on equality of resources," Economics and Philosophy 1,
110-125.
J. Von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern [1944], The theory of games and economic
behavior, Princeton U.P., Princeton.
R. Wolff [1977], Understanding Rawls, Princeton University Press, Princeton.









-1-:' w' ~-~' dJ~-























LA l-e TrI J.AC
rtii










Recent Crest Working Papers
88- 1: Carol A. Jones, Suzanne Scotchmer, "The Social Cost of Uniform Regulatory Standards in a Ilierar-
eli ical Government" l)ecernber, 1987.
88 2: led Bergstrom, Jiy Roberts, D )allulibilufeld, 1'erry Sliapiro, "A 'Test for 1l'licieincy in the S1 pply of
l'illic E'ducatioi" lDecember 12, 1987.
88--3: Mark Bagnoli, J. Bradley Barbeau, "Competition and Product Line Choice" February, 1988.
88-4: Severin Borenstein, Paul N. Courant, "How to Carve a Medical Degree: human Capital Assets in
Divorce Settlements" December, 1987.
88-5: Mark Bagnoli, Stephen W. Salant, Joseph E. Swierzbinski, "Pacrnan Refutes the Coase Conjecture:
Durable-Goods Monopoly with Discrete Demand" January, 1988.
88-6: Jonathan Cave, Stephen W. Salant, "A Median Choice Theorem" December 29, 1987.
88--7: Mark Bagnoli, Naveen Khanna, "Why Are Buyers Represented by Seller's Agents When Buying a
llouse?" December, 1987.
88 8: Mark Bagnoli, Roger Gordon, Barton L. Lipman, "Takeover Bids, Defensive Stock Repurchases, and
the Efficient Allocation of Corporate Control" October, 1987.
88 9: Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman, "Private Provision of Public Goods can be Efficient" November,
1987.
88- 10: Michelle J. White, "Urban Commuting Journeys are Not "Wasteful"" February, 1988.
88 11: Avery Katz, "A Note on Optimal Contract Damages When Litigation is Costly" February, 1988.
88--12: 'red Bergstrom, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, "Notes on Peak Load Pricing" February, 1988.
88-13: Jerry A. Hausman, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, "Price Discrimination and Patent Policy" February,
1988.
89-01: Mark Bagnoli, Severin Borenstein, "Carrot and Yardstick Regulation: Enhancing Market Performance
with Output Prizes" October, 1988.
89-02: Ted Bergstrom, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, "Some Simple Analytics of Peak-Load Pricing" October,
1988.
89-03: Ken Binmore, "Social Contract I: Harsanyi and Rawls" June, 1988.
89-04: Ken Binmore, "Social Contract II: Gauthier and Nash" June, 1988.
89 05: Ken Binmore, "Social Contract III: Evolution and Utilitarianism" June, 1988.
89 06: Ken Binmore, Adam Brandenburger, "Common Knowledge and Game Theory" July, 1988.
89 07: Jeffrey A. Miron, "A Cross Country Comparison of Seasonal Cycles and Business Cycles" November,
1988.
89 08: Jeffrey A. Miron, "The Founding of the Fed and the Destabilization of the Post-1914 Economy"
August, 1988.
89-09: Gerard Gaudet, Stephen W. Salant, "The Profitability of Exogenous Output Contractions: A Comparat ive-
Static Analysis with Application to Strikes, Mergers and Export Subsidies" July, 1988.
89-10: Gerard Gaudet, Stephen W. Salant, "Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old
Methods" August, 1988.
89 -11: Hal R. Varian, "Goodness-of-Fit in Demand Analysis" September, 1988.
89 12: Michelle J. White, "Legal Complexity" October, 1988.
89-13: Michelle J. White, "An Empirical Test of tihe Efficiency of Liability Rules in A ccident Law" November,
1988.
89-14: Carl P. Simon, "Some Fine-Tuning for Dominant Diagonal Matrices" July, 1988.

DATE DUE

